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In an environment where technical solutions for securing networked systems are commonplace, there still exist 
problems in implementation of such solutions for home and small business users. One component of this 
protection is the use of intrusion detection systems. Intrusion detection monitors network traffic for suspicious 
activity, performs access blocking and alerts the system administrator or user of potential attacks. This paper 
reviews the basic function of intrusion detection systems and maps them to an existing end-user capability 
framework. Using this framework, implementation guidance and systematic improvement in implementation of 
this security measure are defined.  
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an alarm system for a computer or network. The concept of IDS was first 
introduced by Anderson in 1980. Anderson identified the reasons for intrusions as: to access information, alter 
information or render a system unusable. Therefore, intrusion detection is a security measure which monitors 
network traffic and alerts the system if there is any suspicious activity occurring in the network. Thus, its role in 
security is to detect, log and raise alarms when intrusion events are detected. Intrusion events can be computer 
attacks or unauthorised access attempts. IDS is similar to burglar alarm in a vehicle. The vehicle is protected by 
a lock system and if this lock is broken, it will alert the user by raising an alarm which indicates that someone is 
trying to steal the car. Intrusion detection systems are often compared with firewall security. A firewall protects 
an organization from malicious attacks outside the network and an intrusion detection system alerts the 
administrator if someone passes through the firewall and accesses the network (Innela & Mcmillan, 2001).  
An IDS monitors for unusual activity and events based on the set-up policy defined by the organisation. It can 
perform certain actions to avoid unauthorized entry by blocking the user or source IP address from accessing the 
network (Sundaram, 1996).  Many IDS systems are proprietary, making the setup and configuration of them 
complex and therefore difficult to an end-user to install and maintain correctly (Whitman, Mattford, & 
Shackleford, 2006). In this paper, the necessity for such a system is presented together with an overview of the 
types of IDS available. Subsequently, the key processes involved in IDS configuration and use are discussed. 
Since IDS is a defensive security measure that is complex to configure and maintain from an end-user 
perspective, a mapping of these processes to the Security Capability Operational Framework developed by 
Williams (2008) is proposed.  
THE NEED FOR INTRUSION DETECTION 
As the complexity of networks increase and access to the unregulated Internet environment, so does the intricacy 
of network attacks. Thus preventing adverse events becomes increasingly difficult. However, mitigation and 
deterrence of malicious hacking and unauthorised intrusions can be put into effect by the use of an IDS 
(Rosenthal, 2002). As such, an IDS is a constituent part of a total security solution and not a total solution in 
itself. However, it is essential for protecting an organization from unauthorized users and should be a part of 
every comprehensive security solution because it detects vulnerabilities in the network and alerts the 
administrator to the possibility of an attack. When an attack pattern is detected and the administrator advised, it 
is vital to include new rules for the IDS and distribute them (Lear, 2000). Consequently, extensible IDS can help 
to install these new rules quicker to all machines without having to reinstall the rules onto each system. Furether, 
there is a need for proper use and maintenance of IDS to ensure they do not negatively impact security over time 
(Adams, 1996). When an IDS detects a potentially adverse event it sends out alerts and logs activity. However, 
whilst an IDS allows for supervision of a network, it still requires appropriate implementation and maintenance. 
IDS technology cannot be effective and operate at an optimum level if implemented haphazardly. To date this 
implementation by end-users has been undertaken poorly (Northcutt & Novak, 2002; Rosenthal, 2002).  To 
understand why this is an issue, it is first necessary to appreciate how an IDS functions.  
IDS TECHNOLOGY 
IDS consist of two components namely a management console and sensors. The management console is the 
reporting console for when an attack occurs, and the sensors are agents that detect and monitor the hosts in a 
network (SANS, 2008). In essence, IDS works by maintaining a database of attack signatures which have been 
obtained from previous malicious activity. These attack signatures are matched with the potentially malicious 
packets that are detected.  
IDS Types 
There are two types of intrusion detection system namely, host based intrusion detection and network based 
intrusion detection system (Innela & Mcmillan, 2001). 
Host-based intrusion detection system  
Host-based intrusion detection works by collecting information from individual computers by detecting and 
monitoring the activities of an attack on an operating system by collecting data from the host computer. Host-
based detection only monitors inbound and outbound packets from the system device. They use two sources of 
information obtained from operating system audit trails and system logs. Operating system audit trails are 
obtained from the kernel of the operating system and system logs give a description about the system activities 
on the network. 
Network-based intrusion detection system  
Network-based of intrusion detection systems work by analysing and capturing the packets in a network. This 
type of IDS monitors traffic patterns and alert the system administrator about potential malicious activity (Innela 
& Mcmillan, 2001). The sensors used in this type of IDS usually run in ‘stealth mode’, hiding their presence and 
avoiding discovery of their presence by attackers. Network intrusion detection system monitors all the inbound 
and outbound packets to and from the devices in the network. 
Detection Approaches.  
Within these types of IDS, two approaches can be adopted for analysing malicious activities to detect attacks. 
There are advantages and disadvantages for both the approaches but the most commonly used method is 
signature based intrusion system (Bradley, 2008). 
Signature Based  
Signature-based IDS work by monitoring packets in the network and comparing them with pre-defined attack 
signatures in a database. The signature detection records each pattern of events as a separate attack signature. 
They are used for detecting attacks whilst minimizing the number of false alarms (Bradley, 2008). Signature 
based detection system also help security managers to track security problems in their systems. Therefore, 
signature based intrusion detection system detects malware the same way as antivirus software’s detect viruses 
and worms. 
Anomaly Based 
Anomaly-based IDS work by analysing any unusual behaviour of the host in the network. The traffic patterns 
for a normal activity are different from the patterns of an attack. The anomaly-based category of IDS monitors 
the traffic and compares it with a known baseline. The baseline provides information about vectors such as the 
bandwidth, protocols used, ports and devices that connect with each system.  
Regardless of the type of IDS employed, standard key processes can be identified for the standard functions of 
IDS.  
KEY IDS PROCESSES 
In investigating existing IDS standards, such as NIST and Standards Australia, a number of common key 
processes have been identified (Saiglobal, 2004; Scarfone& Mell, 2007). These processes can be included in the 
deployment of an efficient intrusion detection system, as shown in the process model in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Process model for efficient intrusion detection systems (Saiglobal, 2004). 
The IDS process model (Figure 1) is underpinned by the data sources it has access to. The data sources are 
important because this data is used to detect intrusions into the network. These data sources can be obtained 
from different levels of the system. Some of the data sources from which intrusions can be found are (Bace & 
Mell, 2007): 
• Auditing the system resources by checking the audit log file of the operating system which includes 
system events and activities. Some of the information such as file access and method of access attempts 
may also be useful. 
• Recording some of the information such as system parameters, memory use and network connections 
are useful for detecting intrusions. 
• Network management logs give information about device status and transition. 
 
In order to implement, and more importantly maintain, an effective IDS it is necessary to identify and describe 
the key processes involved. Ten key processes are described here.  
 
1. Activity monitoring and automation. This is the process for monitoring all user and system activities 
in a network. The system and network configuration are checked for any intrusions. The main two tasks 
of active monitoring are to detect system and network intrusions, and to detect abnormal attack patterns 
and user policy violations (White, 2003). The main purpose of activity monitoring is to alert the 
administrator of the problems caused by crashed servers, overload, malware infection and failed 
connections. 
 
2. Configuration check. This check is done to identify the system and network configuration. It checks 
whether the systems and network have any detectable vulnerabilities. Configuration checking also 
looks for hosts that do not belong to the network. All machines in the network should be checked 
periodically for malware attack. There are also different types of sniffing tools that can be used in this 
configuration checking process. 
 
3. File authorizations. File authorization checking identifies file, user and group authorizations 
modifications. One possible attack vector is to modify the user and group authorization allowing 
various attacks on the network. One way of checking the file settings is to place an expected file setting 
outside the network and then comparing it with the original file settings. 
 
4. Log file examination. Log files record actions and events that take place on a network. Log files can 
be obtained from various devices such as servers and routers. They are mainly used for checking who 
has accessed the network and at what time and from which location. 
 
5. Packet sniffer check. A packet sniffer, often referred to as a network monitor or analyser, can be used 
to detect and troubleshoot network traffic. By analysing the captured packets and identifying the 
malicious packets, the administrator can use this information for protecting the network (Bradley, 
2008). A packet capture usually captures all the packets passing through the network interface. There 
are various ways to undertake this, either by capturing packets to the machine only or capturing all the 
packets in promiscuous mode. The issue with promiscuous mode is that any intruder can also capture 
and analyse traffic. 
 
6. Password files check. Password file checking is done periodically to ensure users change passwords 
regularly, since unauthorized users try to obtain the passwords and usernames for creating accounts. If 
new unauthorised accounts are detected, the accounts should be deleted from the system password file 
together with all compromised files. Passwords should be checked and changed frequently by the 
system administrator. 
 
7. Services check. These checks are done to identify any unnecessary services running on the operating 
system. Many services may create backdoors for hackers to exploit the vulnerabilities in the system 
(Saiglobal, 2004).  A service check is done to identify these services and remove the services that are 
not needed.  
 
8. File integrity assessment. The file integrity assessment is important to determine if a file has been 
tampered with. Usually such assessments methods can be done manually, however utilising an 
automated detection method will increase reliability and therefore effectiveness (Saiglobal, 2004). 
Automated IDS is an effective and efficient method of performing statistical analysis and integrity 
checking. 
 
9. Response. Response is the action that a system takes when detecting intrusions on a network. It is most 
usefully employed when presenting the event analysis results using a graphical user interface. There are 
several methods to alert administrators of events such as via email or pagers (Saiglobal, 2004). A 
system administrator can then ascertain the severity of the response and make decisions on the most 
appropriate countermeasures. In some IDS, the reaction-response is also able to perform preventive 
actions such as locking the account that was attacked and therefore reducing additional potential 
damage to the system.  
 
10. Data storage. Data storage is required for storing all detected activities, audit logs and other relevant 
information in a database. This database will contain collection of attacks, unusual behaviour patterns 
and other attacks that can be used for future detection of intrusions. It can also store the detected 
malicious activity for subsequent use as evidence. 
These key processes can be used to delineate specific activities for end-user maintenance of their IDS.  One 
method to make this accessible and understandable to the end-user is to map these processes to a capability 
operational framework.  One such framework to enable mapping of security activities to end-user capabilities is 
the adapted CMM Operation Framework (Williams, 2008). 
CAPABILITY MATURITY MODEL (CMM) OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
A capability maturity model (CMM) is a methodology founded in 1986 by Software Engineering Institute (SEI) 
at Carnegie Mellon University to develop organizational software development processes. The main purpose of 
this model is to guide and help organizations to develop and maintain their key process areas. This model has 
been modified and developed by many companies to improve their capability in key management areas. One of 
the important factors to be considered for CMM is using the knowledge of the maturity levels and identifying 
the differences between mature and immature organizational processes.  
 
CMM provides five distinct levels for measuring the maturity of the development of processes. These maturity 
levels help in providing a well-defined, proper path for achieving improved processes. In this case we are 
looking at improving the implementation and maintenance processes of intrusion detection systems. The 
different levels are defined in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The capability operational framework, maturity levels description (Carnegie Mellon University, 2003).  
 
Level Heading Description 
1 Initial Procedures are performed in an ad hoc manner 
2 Repeatable Procedures are tracked and follow a regular pattern 
3 Defined Procedures documented and communicated 
4 Managed Procedures monitored and measured 
5 Optimized Best Practice procedures followed and automated 
 
The CMM operation framework (Figure 2) maps specific activities into definable levels of capability. The levels 
are defined to allow both assessment of the current level of capability and to identify how improvement to a 
higher level cane attained. Using this model, specific activities can be deconstructed into manageable segments 
to make them understandable and implemented by the end-user.  
 
 
Figure 2. An apapted Capability Maturity Model (CMM) operational framework for mapping security activities 
to capability (Williams, 2008). 
 
The results below show how a mapping of IDS key processes can be translated into this oprtational framework.  
RESULTS 
Using the key processes for IDS identified by the standards (as discussed above), a mapping was created to 
elucidate on the activities involved and the capability level these can be attributed to (Table 2). Each key process 
listed above was deconstructed into its constituent activities and defined at increasing levels of effectiveness. 
These constituent activities are placed in the table against one of the five defined levels of capability where 
assessment of complexity of the activity is matched to the capability levels 1-5 (Table 1).  
 
The construction of the table and allocation of each activity at each level is an informed but somewhat arbitrary 
process. However it does enable clear identification of each task for each process. Key processes at level 1 are 
either non-existent or of limited implementation. Similarly, those at level 5 are well developed, mostly 
automated and reflect best practice. For instance, the key process of ‘configuration checking’ is not undertaken 
at level 1 and is automated using scanning tools at level 5. The mapping in Table 2 also indicates the support 
required and the tools available for deploying an IDS.  It should be noted that whilst ‘policy’ is not listed as a 
key process, “security policies and procedures go hand-in-hand with technological countermeasure such as 
firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs), towards leveraging the organization’s security posture, 
mitigating risk, and maintaining financial and competitive viability” (Rosenthal, 2002).   




Level 1(Initial) Level 2(repeatable) Level 3(defined) Level 4(managed) Level 5(optimized) 
IDS Policy 
 Does not exist Verbal Written 
Written for packet sniffer, 
monitoring and response. 
Policy is written for monitoring, packet sniffer, response 
and backup storage. 
Policy 
communication Not communicated  
verbally 
communicated  
Written and provided to 
some staff 
Policy in written form; training 
provided for some staff 





Monitoring does not 
take place 
Manual monitoring of 
some system 
activities 
 Manual monitoring of all 
the system activities 
Automated monitoring for 
user, system and policy 
violations 
Automated monitoring of abnormal attack patterns on the 




No configuration check 
takes place 
Manual checking of 
some system 
vulnerabilities monthly 
Periodic automated check 
of some system and 
network vulnerabilities 
Periodic automated check of 
all systems and networks 
Automated configuration checking of each system and 




No manual checking of 
files done 
Manually file checking 
takes place for user 
authorization 
File authorization takes 
place automatically to 
check tampering of user 
data periodically 
File authorization takes place 
automatically to check 
tampering of user and group 
authorization periodically 
Automatic file authorization check for tampering for user 
and group authorization daily and maintain file access 




Log file examination not 
done 
Manually basic 
security log files are 
examined 
Automatically log files are 
examined for router 
periodically 
Automatically log files are 
examined for router and 
server periodically 
All the log files for router, server, process and other 
security logs are examined automatically per day 
Packet sniffer 
check 




Monitoring the system and 
its configuration for packet 
sniffer. 
Automated system and 
network done for monitoring 
sniffing tools 
Automated system and network checking is done for 
identifying unauthorized sniffing tool, packet analysis is 










Automated checking of 
accounts deletion of user 
accounts not required. 
Automated deletion of all 
unauthorized accounts and 
other files with change of 
passwords periodically 
Automated deletion of all unauthorized accounts and files 
that are compromised from the systems password file on a 
regular basis. The system passwords are changed 
regularly. 
Services check No unwanted services are checked. 
Manually uninstalling 
all the unwanted 
services installed. 
Automated checking of 
some unwanted services 
done periodically 
Automated checking of all 
services weekly. 
Automated checking of all the unwanted services installed 
in the operating system. The service files are analyzed for 
intrusion and unnecessary files are removed by users. 
File integrity 
assessment 
Integrity of file not 
checked 
Integrity of file 
checked monthly 
Integrity of file checked 
weekly Integrity of file checked daily 
Integrity of file checked daily and countermeasures taken 
for it. 
Response Response detected without any measures. 
Response send to 
management console 
only 
Response is send to 
management console and 
administrator 
Response is send to senior 
administrator giving a 
graphical user interface of 
events detected. 
Response is send to specified senior administrator by 
email, pager etc, management console and preventive 
measures taken. 
Backup storage Storage is done near the system Near the locker onsite 
Backup data taken home 
by staff  and returned 
Backup data  is taken offsite 
and stored Backup data is taken offsite and multiple copies are made 
Backup data 
security access Only employees Specified employees 
Specified administrator 
assigned. Senior staff and administrator Senior administrator and manager.  




Intrusion detection and  
training provided for 
newcomers 
Understanding all the basic 
Intrusions detection methods, 
initial training and disaster 
recovery plan, 
Full training provided on various sections of intrusion 
detection, disaster recovery plan implemented, proper 
induction for all the newcomers. 
TOOLS Support Support is not available Ad hoc is supported Support is available 
Support is contracted and 
available In house contract and support available 
Software     Airdefense or similar used 
DISCUSSION 
Table 2 demonstrates how intrusion detection implementation can be clarified into manageable steps using the 
capability operational framework and matched to the end-users’ capabilities. The application of the activity 
mapping in Table 2 can be used for two activities. Firstly to assess the current level of security capability in the 
use of IDS and secondly to identify potential improvements in security practice. The table could be enhanced 
when applied to a specific end-user profession by identifying the legal and ethical requirements of that 
profession in relation to IDS implementation. In this case, correlation of professional and legal requirements 
with the defined levels of capability would be undertaken. Using the mapping, the current level of capability of 
the end-user can be assessed and improvement is based upon this starting point. 
 
Table 2 provides information to the user about the CMM operational maturity levels which can be achieved and 
how to achieve them.  The levels are defined as increasing in complexity and effectiveness in terms of IDS 
implementation and maintenance. For instance, the initial level to the optimized level gives a new user who is 
not skilled in intrusion detection system to develop and maintain it. The process of intrusion detection system 
can improve depending upon each level. The initial level shows that all the processes are in ad hoc manner and 
the optimized level indicates the best practice. Best practice (level 5) is the ultimate target for every 
implementation of IDS. Most of the processes can be done manually or automated. Automated processes work 
quicker and are more efficient than manually performing tasks.  
 
The limitations of the framework mapping need to be considered as do the limitations of the IDS technology 
itself. IDS is only part of the security management solution and thus taking this framework mapping in isolation 
to other security will not result in effective security. However, the mapping of an activity using the CMM 
operational framework provides a straightforward representation of the essential processes for IDS 
implementation and maintenance. Further, it creates a structure for improvement based on small defines steps 
where improvement in security can be incremental. This is important in the application of security measures 
which are complex and difficult for the end-user to put into practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Intrusion detection systems have been widely accepted as an essential security measure as part of a total security 
solution.  They are an important component because IDS helps identify threats to a network by comparison to 
known signatures. Further, it is important that all component processes of effective IDS use are implemented 
correctly. The automated monitoring which IDS provides can greatly assist organisations in their security efforts 
by logging events, gathering information about network activity, detecting potential unauthorised intrusions and 
attacks, preventing actions using blocking and alerting the systems administrator of potential adverse intrusion 
events.  
 
The IDS capability mapping (Table 2) presented is being used in current research to assess the capability of end-
users in security implementation in the primary care medical field. Whilst the IDS security activity defined in 
this paper provides guidance for improvement in security practices, expansion of the mapping table would be 
required to identify potential accreditation to national and international standards for IDS security. Further, for 
application in specific professional area, correlation of professional endorsement standards related to IDS should 
be added to the CMM operation framework table of activities. This would provide an uncomplicated method for 
assessment of current IDS capability for the end-user and provide evidence of best practice for accreditation 
purposes.  
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